Professor Daniel Schueftan On The Israeli View of President Trump’s Decision On Iran
As President Trump weighs his decision on what to do regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israeli national security expert Daniel Schueftan joined Hugh to discuss what POTUS should do and why:
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Transcript:
HH: Professor Dan Schueftan is the preeminent Israeli national security expert. That’s what Haviv Rettig Gur called him in an interview done with Professor Schueftan on February the 2nd, which I heard and said we’ve got to go get this guy. He sounds like Israel’s Kissinger. Professor, welcome to the Hugh Hewitt Show. That was a fabulous episode with Haviv. Thank you for joining me today. I want to begin by saying to the audience they should go listen to that entire hour and ten minutes with Haviv. It was taped on February 2nd. But I don’t have that time, so I want to condense one thing you said. You said American presidents can be smart or dumb on the Middle East. Eisenhower and Obama were dumb. Johnson and Nixon were smart. How do you rate Trump?
DS: Trump has the right instincts. And mostly what he did in the Middle East was very helpful for the whole region. Think of the Abraham Accords. Think of the recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. And the support he had for Israel when Israel needed not only to assert its power not only to destroy the terrorists, but also to deter them from the immediate next step. And now the question is, of course, how it will work with Iran and with Lebanon. But so far, his instincts about the Middle East were correct, and he was certainly not the kind of naïve president that we had in Jimmy Carter and in Barack Obama. Eisenhower made a terrible mistake in his first term in office, in 1956. But by 1958, he already corrected it by understanding that it was a mistake to build up Nasser. But you have presidents like Nixon and Kissinger as national security advisor and Secretary of State who were excellent in the Middle East.
HH: Now Professor, that leads us to my seconed question. What do you hope President Trump decides to do about Iran and when?
DS: First of all, I don’t think you can arrive at something that the Iranians will agree to, because whatever Iran accepts will be terrible for the whole region and beyond this region. This regime is as dangerous a combination as we had Nazi Germany in the sense that they’re very able people and very barbaric leadership is a combination that presents a danger to the entire region and beyond. And unless this regime is undermined, weakened, and hopefully one day replaced, you cannot rest in the Middle East with the regular problems. We have problems even without Iran, but Iran makes these problems unacceptable by the way, not only to the region. Very soon, if they have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, they can reach Europe. They can dominate the Middle East. They can use all the oil in the region, control of Mecca and Medina. They can be a major power. Let me put it this way. North Korea will be considered minor compared to Iran if Iran, if we make the same mistake in Iran that we made with North Korea, allowing them to get nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
HH: Now in the conversation with Haviv, you said that the arch-radical in the Middle East, Iran, had been terribly weakened. And I agree. But what do you want, President Trump has surged a lot of American striking power into the region as well as a lot of defensive power that might have been there when the demonstrations began in December. It definitely wasn’t there. Do you want him to hit Iran this week, next month, three months from now? And what do you want him to hit in Iran?
DS: I don’t see any other choice, because again, if the Iranians even agree to something on the nuclear issue but maintain the unbelievable capacity they have to build a very large number of ballistic missiles, we will have the same problems that we have today only compounded, only multiplied by ten in a very short time. You need to destroy the Iranian economy, certainly not under any circumstances whatsoever allow the sanctions to go away, certainly not to prevent the possibility of Iran being so weak that it cannot at the same time satisfy its own citizens and support the entire array of proxies that they have in the Middle East. So whatever is bad for the Iranian economy, whatever undermines its military capacity, is good. If I thought that any kind of an agreement could be helpful, I would be for an agreement. It should always be the first choice. But I don’t see any kind of agreement that the United States can live with, Europe can live with, Israel can live with, the most of the Arab states can live with. I don’t see any of that. And therefore, now that we have the opportunity, I think that the military strike will be very helpful.
HH: Now I agree with that assessment of agreements, Professor. I don’t know that I’ve heard anyone but you mention economic targets before. I’ve asked a number of our military analysts who’ve come on, and political analysts. I had President Trump on, in fact, in January, but I didn’t ask him this. Why Israel and the United States did not his Kharg Island or the other two oil terminals? Iran’s got nothing except oil. I mean, they don’t export anything. I guess pistachios and caviar, but should Kharg Island be taken out in a second round of strikes?
DS: I would be very careful there. Remember, we don’t want an enormous surge in oil prices all around the world. It will not only be the Iranian resources, it will be in the entire Gulf. It has impacts on the Straits of Hormuz. It can change the entire balance of power. For instance, I don’t want the Russians to get more money from selling oil after the price of oil doubles. Remember, we, under a war we had in 1973, the oil prices quadrupled, and again quadrupled. Now I don’t think that we will go that far, but I would be careful before I do that. If I go in this direction, then I would take it only if other means don’t work. Then, you have to destroy this as well. But it’s not as if you do it, you harm Iran, and that’s the end of it. That’s not the end of it.
HH: All right, so Professor Shueftan, this is a missiles-first for me, then IRGC headquarters. If you can find the Supreme Leader, great. Blow him up. But that’s my target list. Do you have a better one?
DS: I would hit in Iran, first of all, whatever is left of the nuclear project, whatever you can hit concerning the missiles, the ballistic missiles, any other military target, and whatever harms their economy – their ports, their, anything that can harm. They are in a terrible economic situation. They don’t have water. They don’t have electricity. Nothing works. You need to bring out the people of Iran when they are desperate about the ability to live in Iran. They’re already in very, very bad shape. And you should compound it. You should make it even more difficult in Iran, economically.
HH: Okay, what do you make of the regime over the weekend putting out AI videos about sinking the Abraham Lincoln, sinking other American ships? And does that telegraph to you incredible weakness and fear? Or are they trying to get inside American heads? They should have bought a Super Bowl ad. They didn’t, but they should have if they wanted to get that message out there. What are they doing?
DS: They are, I think, underestimating the difficulty of their own situation. I don’t think they understand how bad their situation is. And they are doing things that they could have done if they had a better bargaining position. I wouldn’t be alarmed for it. Let me put it this way. If the Iranians can hit effectively an American aircraft carrier, then America is in very, very bad shape. And if anything like that happened, and they even try, and the United States doesn’t respond in a very major way, then we have a problem. Look, these barbarians, you need not only to hit and to starve, you need to humiliate them. If they’re not humiliated, this is a world order where the United States cannot function. Then everything you’re doing in Venezuela and in Cuba, and in other parts of the world, and vis-à-vis Russia doesn’t work. If you don’t break and humiliate these minor threats to the national security of the United States, what will the Chinese learn about it when they come to hit Taiwan? What will the Russians learn when they need to reach some kind of agreement in Ukraine, in Europe? So unless you humiliate, break the Iranians, you can’t in any way proceed with any major objective of the United States on the international arena.
HH: Professor, after Soleimani was killed by, on orders of President Trump in 2020, the Iranians hit the al Asad base with great precision. Now we were, we either had the intelligence capability to see it coming, or we were tipped off by the Iranians or a third party that it was coming, and the base was evacuated. Only a few soldiers were injured. So they can hit bases. How much damage do you think, ships are different. Ships don’t have a GPS, but bases do. How much damage do you think Iran can do to the U.S., to Israel, and the Middle East if the United States and Israel hit it very hard, very fast?
DS: They can do considerable damage to American bases, to American allies in the Middle East, to Israel. The question is are you willing to take a minor hit when you don’t allow them to behave this way? Or will you take a ten times harder hit if you wait and let them not only arm again, but also have the self-confidence that you need in order to do it? It’s not only the Americans who benefited from the fact that no Americans were killed by the Iranian missiles. Iran benefited from it, because there was no American response. So unless you prove that whatever they do, you can always escalate much more than they can, you see, this is where Israel has a lot of experience over a hundred years, even before the establishment of the state of Israel. Unless we can escalate more than all of our enemies, we are doomed. And the United States can definitely escalate. So whatever the question, the answer is more force. In other words, if there is one thing that they can do that we cannot make them sorry that they did, I think that we are doomed. In this region, this is something the Israelis have learned from their experience, and the Americans are learning now. Anybody who’s not afraid of you, you should be afraid of them.
HH: Israel has taken enormous casualties since 10/7, and of course, since the founding of the state, and even before in 1929 in Israel and in the Middle East. The United States is not very capable of taking casualties like we did in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and long wars. Do you fear America has lost the ability to take casualties? And I say that with active duty family members. I am not indifferent to it. I’m just a realist about this.
DS: Look, Israel behaved irresponsibly vis-à-vis Hamas before the 7th of October, and we brought 7th of October on us, because we wanted peace at any cost. We wanted tranquility at any cost. We didn’t realize that we can’t afford it. And the result was many more casualties. You can either take some casualties when you select when to go to war, or many more casualties when they select when to go to war when they’re ready to go to war. So because we are more ready now than ever before, and they are in the weakest possible bargaining position that they’ve ever been, this is the time to see to it that they will regret it.
HH: Now Professor, I’m talking to you before I talk to Prince Pahlavi, who’s coming up in a taping session when I’m done with you. I am curious what you think I should ask the Prince about Iran.
DS: How can he or anybody provide a leadership for the people who are rebelling in Iran? They’re unbelievably courageous. He is all they have at the moment. We need much more than in terms of a coordinated leadership so that people on the one hand will not let the existing situation continue, and at the same time, they should have an alternative reality. Nobody wants chaos in Iran. Nobody wants, even if this regime is gone, to have a situation where we cannot find a substitute, where we have nobody responsible in Tehran that we can speak to. So the most urgent goal of anybody at the moment concerning the unrest in Iran itself is to find a wide leadership that enjoys the support of a considerable part of the Iranian people. This is extremely important. Remember, when the Shah fell, it was not so much the weakness of the Shah, but an alternative was there. The alternative of Khomeini was there. And Iranian democrats were stupid enough in order to believe that they can replace the Shah together with the mullahs and then bring about something that is better than the Shah. A lot of the questions are decided domestically. When I’m looking at Israel today, my major concerns are how do you translate the unbelievable resilience of the Israeli people that we have shown in this war into more of a political benefit? So a strong Israel is strong primarily because of a strong society, and a resilient society. In Iran, you have a lot of brave people, but you don’t have enough organized leadership to take over.
HH: Now Professor, I can remember a time when Iran was an ally of Israel prior to the revolution. Do you think it can ever go back to that after 47 years of being sheep-dipped in anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, anti-American sentiment?
DS: Definitely. Definitely.
HH: It can go back?
DS: Definitely. First of all, anti-Semitic today, in the West, you have so much anti-Semitism, including, unfortunately, in the United States, that if we were to think that if there is anti-Semitism, then we cannot go anywhere, we would be in very bad shape. Today, anti-Semitism is more popular than any recent time in history that I can think of. In Iran, you have a people who are unbelievably capable. Unlike the Arab world, most of the Arab world, with few exceptions, notably the UAE, unlike the Arab world where you have a society that is not functioning or is incapable at the moment of meeting the challenges of the 21st Century, in Iran, the society is. They are capable of a high-level of science, of technology. Many of them want a pluralistic society. My guess is that about a quarter or a third of the Iranian society wants something like the mullahs, and a majority of Iranians not only want another regime, but also are capable to develop a very strong society, a society that will be more pluralistic, a society that can win its position in the Middle East not by rockets and nuclear weapons, but by being more capable than its Arab neighbors. So I don’t think that people who want to make Iran great again need to think beyond replacing this regime. If they replace it with something that functions and reflects the qualities of a majority of the Iranian people, we will have a kind of coalition in the Middle East of Iran, Israel, and the United States. And they can work together with those Arabs who want a more stable Middle East, a less radical Middle East. And you can have a great future for this region if there is no major radical force. Remember, most Arab states at the moment don’t want regional wars, don’t want major confrontations. Radical forces were eradicated, or at least very severely hit by Israel. Today, we have less functioning radicals in the Middle East than we had before. Today, we have to deal with problems like Turkey and Qatar, which are very serious problems. And I’m very sorry that the president of the United States supports Turkey and Qatar. But at the moment in the Middle East, there are no radicals that are strong enough to change the reality inside the Arab world. If Iran is out of this picture, the whole region will look different.
HH: Two more questions, Professor, and you’ve been generous with your time. Thank you for that. You, it’s like you’re reading my outline. You just mentioned United Arab Emirates in the beginning part of the last answer. I think Israel is the equal if not better than any ally America has because it’s nuclear, because it has the will to use its power, because it projects power, and it’s pro-American. Our European allies are a little big sclerotic. We’ve got great allies in Asia in Japan and Australia and South Korea and Philippines and Taiwan. But Israel is number one. Do you put the UAE in the same circle of allyship for America as everyone other than Israel? I think Israel is our most important ally for a lot of reasons. But in that second tier, do you put the UAE in there?
DS: Yes, for two reasons. Not only because it’s more committed, but also because there is a fascinating experience in the UAE of trying to do something about their own society. They’re educated, their elite for tolerance, I’ve had a lot of experience in the UAE. I’ve visited the place nine times in the last two years. I’m friends with the foreign minister, Sheikh Abdullah, and I’m very, very impressed by this person. I’ve been teaching there in their diplomatic academy. And I’m unbelievably impressed. I’m very deeply impressed by what they’re trying to do in their own society. They are really trying and succeeding to meet the challenges of the 21st Century. And I would like to see in the Arab world more like the UAE. Israel is, as you said, in a very unique situation. I think the best thing for the United States would be if the United States had three Israels – one in the Middle East, one next to North Korea, and one next to Venezuela and Cuba. I think the American would have benefited from the fact that the Israelis are willing to be fierce and committed when Americans sometimes hesitate.
HH: Amen. Amen. Now I want to close on a discordant note, because if I agree with you on everything, it’s no fun. In my view, Professor, I don’t know anyone in Israel who could have led Israel after 10/7 other than Prime Minister Netanyahu. I know you were an advisor to Rabin and Peres, and pretty much everybody else on the other side. Do you agree with me that I don’t know who but Bibi, I don’t know if you need him now, but for the last two-and-a-half years, could anyone else have done this?
DS: It is a very complex question, because Netanyahu has a good strategic mind, and made very good, important decisions in this war. On the other hand, his government is the worst government that Israel ever had, including the ultra-orthodox parasites. So I think it’s a mixed bag. And Israel, like the United States, like all democracies, has a major problem where the political sphere is very deeply divided. We are lucky, unlike the United States, that the Israeli society is not divided. And the Israeli society is the eighth wonder of the world in spite of the problems we have on the political level. But yes, Benjamin Netanyahu has all my criticism against him on many other things. The decisions, the major decisions in this war were correct, particularly not stopping the war when many others, almost everybody pushed enormously to stop it in the beginning of ’24. Had we done it in the beginning of ’24, the results would have been catastrophic. And I think that when you blame somebody for the drought, you also need to give him credit for the rain. In other words, when you say, and you should say that being prime minister for so long, he has special responsibility for our being unprepared on October 7th, at the same time, coming out of this predicament, I think the achievements of the moves that he led were enormous.
HH: Professor Dan Schueftan, I hope you will come back again and again. That was a fabulous half-hour, and I appreciate you taking that much time. And I again, I recommend to everyone. Go over to Ask Haviv Anything, the February 2nd interview. It’s much longer than this. It’s 71 minutes long, and it’s all gold. And it’s where I found the professor. I have to give Haviv a quarter or something. I don’t know. I think he’s my booking agent. But thank you, Professor. I look forward to talking to you again in the future.
DS: Thank you.
End of interview.

